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SURVEY SECTION
Commercial Law. Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah,
728 A.2d 1057 (R.I. 1999). The Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined that legal malpractice claims, which were transferred as
part of a larger commercial transaction, were assignable.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On December 3, 1992, Fleet Credit Corporation (Fleet), acting
both as a lender and as an agent for a number of other financial
institutions (the Lenders) entered into a loan and security agree-
ment with SLM International, Inc. (SLM).' Gadsby & Hannah
(Gadsby) served as counsel for Fleet in this transaction. 2 In 1994,
Masca, USA, an SLM subsidiary, purchased a business in New
Hampshire.3 As a result, the original loan and security agreement
was amended to include this acquisition.' Gadsby filed financing
statements in New Hampshire for the assets and inventory of the
newly acquired business; however, it did not file such a statement
in New Hampshire for Masca's assets and inventory. 5 As a result,
when Masca later moved its own inventory from Vermont to New
Hampshire, the interest of Fleet and the other Lenders in those
assets and inventory were rendered unperfected. 6
SLM started having financial problems in late 1994.7 Two law
firms, Schatz & Schatz and Ribicoff & Kotkin (collectively, Schatz),
took over as counsel for Fleet and the other Lenders.8 In March of
1995, several of SLM's creditors filed claims against SLM in Dela-
ware and Canada bankruptcy courts.9 All of these claims were ul-
timately dismissed.' 0 On October 24, 1995, SLM voluntarily
petitioned to be reorganized under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 1 ' On the same day, Masca initiated a lawsuit against Fleet.
It sought "to avoid the lien from the Lenders' security interest in
1. See Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 1057, 1058
(R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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Masca's inventory in New Hampshire."12 That lawsuit was even-
tually settled.13
After the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings against SLM in
March of 1995 by several of its creditors, a number of Lenders, in-
cluding Fleet, started to sell off their SLM loans, along with the
privileges and duties associated with those loans, to other financial
institutions. 14 Plaintiffs in the this lawsuit are all financial insti-
tutions who purchased these loans.15
Because of the earlier failure to perfect in New Hampshire the
security interest stemming from the loans, the plaintiffs did not
receive the complete value of their purchased loans and, as a re-
sult, had to settle with SLM for a smaller amount.' 6 Plaintiffs
sued the two law firms, Gadsby and Schatz, who had represented
the Lenders in the commercial transactions with SLM.17 Plaintiffs
argued that Gadsby was negligent for not perfecting the Lenders'
security interest in SLM's assets and that Schatz was negligent for
not uncovering Gadsby's failure to do so, especially in light of the
fact that Schatz was aware of SLM's financial problems.' s Plain-
tiffs further alleged
that as successors in interest to the original Lenders, they are
entitled to assert their claims for legal malpractice, negligent
misrepresentation and omissions, breach of a third-party
beneficiary contract, and breach of contract against those law
firms and their partners and that the claims should be deter-
mined in accordance with the law of New York.19
Defendants did not agree.20 Gadsby moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a cause of action. 2' The hear-
ingjustice treated defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action as a motion for summary judgment because he
had allowed plaintiffs to submit materials other than the pleadings
for consideration (i.e., loan documents, agreements and an affida-
12. Id.
13. See id.
14, See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 1057.
18. See id. at 1058.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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vit).22 He then granted the motion for summary judgment for two
reasons. 23 First, there was no attorney-client relationship between
the plaintiffs and the defendants, which the hearing justice con-
cluded was mandatory under Rhode Island law in order to main-
tain a legal malpractice claim. 24 Second, public policy prohibited
assigning legal malpractice claims.25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Choice of Law
The court first held that Rhode Island law was applicable to
the instant action.26 The original loan and security agreements
entered into by the Lenders and SLM specified that Rhode Island
law was controlling.27 The assignment agreements subsequently
entered into by the Lenders and the financial institutions, who
were plaintiffs in this lawsuit, specified that New York law was
controlling.28 The court determined that "[ulnder those assign-
ment agreements, the plaintiffs acquired all of the rights and obli-
gations that the Lenders had under the original loan agreements,
no more and no less."29 Consequently, the plaintiff financial insti-
tutions received "the same rights that the Lenders had to bring a
legal malpractice action."30 Thus, they were limited to the choice
of law designated in the original agreements. New York law would
apply only to the assignment agreements and any lawsuits result-
ing from those agreements. 31 Given that the legal malpractice ac-
tion here arose from the original agreements, Rhode Island law
governed.3 2
Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims
The court then noted that "the assignment of legal malpractice
claims as an integral part of a larger commercial transaction is an
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1058-59.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 1059.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
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issue of first impression in Rhode Island."33 The court was particu-
larly concerned with the specific circumstances present in the case.
It determined that when the plaintiff financial institutions
purchased the loans, they also received all of the duties and rights
attendant with those loans, including the right of the Lenders to
sue the defendants for legal malpractice. 34 This was very different
from a situation where no duties or rights are transferred along
with a legal malpractice claim, such as where the legal malpractice
claim is the only thing transferred.3 5 Other jurisdictions that have
dealt with the issue of the assignability of legal malpractice claims
have predicated their holdings of nonassignability specifically on
the fact that no rights or duties other than the legal malpractice
claim itself were transferred. 36 The court pointed to the fact that
in March of 1999, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
aligned itself with the five other jurisdictions holding that volun-
tary assignments of legal malpractice claims were enforceable. 37
Furthermore, the court determined that no public policy rea-
son existed for requiring a blanket prohibition of all cases dealing
with assignments. 38 The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed
with courts in other jurisdictions "that have distinguished between
the voluntary assignment of a bare legal claim for malpractice and
the assignment of a claim for malpractice that is part of a general
assignment in a commercial setting and transaction that encom-
passes a panoply of other assigned rights, duties, and
obligations."39
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1059-60 (quoting Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d
389 (1976) (holding that "[iut is the unique quality of legal services, the personal
nature of the attorney's duty to the client and the confidentiality of the attorney-
client relationship that invoke public policy considerations in our conclusion that
malpractice claims should not be subject to assignment").
37. See Cerberus, 728 A.2d at 1060. See also New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Mc-
Cann, Inc. 707 N.E.2d 332 (Mass. 1999) (holding that a voluntary assignment of a
legal malpractice claim was enforceable in that jurisdiction).
38. See Cerberus, 728 A.2d at 1060.
39. Id. See also Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1996) (hold-
ing that public policy did not prohibit the assignment of legal malpractice claims
where there was no "fear that parties will sell off claims, particularly to opponents
or completely unrelated third parties, and [no] concern about jeopardizing the per-
sonal nature of legal services").
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Moreover, the court asserted that its determination that legal
malpractice claims were assignable in circumstances like those
present here was in accord with the General Assembly's legislation
pertaining to the Rhode Island Depositors Economic protection
Corporation (DEPCO).4o This legislation seemingly "recognize[s]
the assignability of a malpractice claim incident to a commercial
banking transaction" as not being void as against public policy.41
Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that "a legal mal-
practice claim [could] be assigned when transferred as part of a
larger commercial transaction assignment."42
CONCLUSION
In a case of first impression, Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby
& Hannah, the Rhode Island Supreme Court joined Massachusetts
and five other jurisdictions in determining that legal malpractice
claims could be assigned, along with other assets, duties, and
rights, to assignees as part of larger commercial transactions. Such
assignments were found to be consistent with both Rhode Island
public policy and Rhode Island legislation.
Helena R. Pacheco
40. See Cerberus, 728 A.2d at 1061.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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